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of  cumulative disadvantage. Although  the  economic  vulnerability  of  refugees  has 
been highlighted previously, this paper shows that within the refugee population, 






Legislation shapes individuals’ life trajectories. This is particularly true 
for refugees who come to Europe to find shelter, since their administra-
tive status and residence permit determine their rights and opportunities 
to integrate into the host society. Taking the case study of Switzerland 
– one of the European countries with the highest number of refugees per 
inhabitant –, this study focuses on the issue of the impact of Swiss legis-
lation on refugees’ life courses from the moment they arrive in the coun-
try. To do so, I draw a parallel between the residence permit system and 
its actual effects on refugees’ chances to integrate into the labour market. 
In this paper, the term «refugee» is used to refer to all the individuals who 
came to Switzerland seeking asylum no matter the outcome of the asylum 
procedure, and not only to those who obtained the status as defined by 
the 1951 Geneva Convention. Whenever needed, the latter are specifi-
cally referred to as «recognized refugees». The choice of a «broad» defi-
nition ensures that the concept of refugee is not reduced to the sole mean-




does not reflect the complexity of persecution of victims of forced migra-
tion and the wide variety of reasons that drive people to flee. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: taking the «refugee gap» as a 
starting point, I go further into the subdivision of the refugees’ adminis-
trative statuses and focus on the issue of precarious	 legal	statuses. The 
next section describes the legislation relating to the residence permit sys-
tem faced by refugees in Switzerland, which leads to the research ques-
tion and hypotheses. Drawing on examples from previous studies, the 
«methods» section begins with a discussion about the challenge of con-
ducting quantitative longitudinal research on the refugee population. It is 
followed by a presentation of the data and of the indicator I use to capture 
labour market integration. Trajectories of residence permits and labour 
market integration are then both examined through sequence analysis. 
Finally, the impact of residence permits on labour market integration op-
portunities is evaluated using survival models and discussed. 
Background 
The «refugee gap» 
Structural integration, including in particular integration into the labour 
market, has long been (and still is) considered as a key indicator of a 
broader integration process (Gordon, 1964). The economic vulnerability 
of the refugee population compared to other immigrant groups and to the 
natives – the so-called «refugee gap» – has been assessed by many re-
searchers (see Ott (2013) for an extensive literature review on the sub-
ject). Nowadays, it remains a burning topic as illustrated by the recent 
work of Newman et	al. (2018) who edited a special issue devoted to the 
employment of refugees, by the study of Bakker et	al. (2017) on the refu-
gee gap they observe in the Netherlands, and by the proposition of Ban-
sak et	al. (2018) to use an algorithm that allocates refugees to specific 
resettlement locations in order to improve their chances of employment 
within the host country. The question of labour market integration does 
not only concern the refugees who crossed a border to seek for protec-
tion, but also the internally displaced persons who face as well a long-
term effect of cumulative disadvantage due to their forced displacement 
(Ivlevs, Veliziotis, 2018). 
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However, difficulties in integrating into the labour market of the host 
country cannot be explained solely by having migrated for asylum rea-
sons. In fact, the filing of an asylum application marks the beginning of a 
complex administrative process made up of transitions between multiple 
statuses and residence permits. The precariousness of some of these sta-
tuses and permits creates an additional hierarchy within the refugee 
group itself. This hierarchy, inherent to the various statuses and permits, 
leads to inequalities in opportunities for integration, particularly with re-
gard to access to the labour market – even if, of course, it also impacts 
other life areas, such as possibilities concerning family reunification, 
housing, or mobility (both within and outside the host country). All these 
dimensions are linked and affect the integration of refugees into the soci-
ety. 
Precarious legal statuses 
The paramount role of legislation and immigration policies on the «legal 
construction of illegality» has been highlighted in various contexts. For 
example, Calavita (1998) analysed the social and economic exclusion of 
immigrants in Spain, De Genova (2002) focussed on the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der, and Vickstrom (2014) took the case of Senegalese migrants in France, 
Italy, and Spain. Overcoming the binary distinction between the «docu-
mented» and the «undocumented», Menjívar (2006) proposed the con-
cept of «liminal legality» to shed light on the grey area of in-between sit-
uations faced by Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants who were 
granted a «temporary protected status» (TPS) in the U.S. This is related 
to the notion of «permanent temporariness» brought by Bailey et	 al. 
(2002) who also analysed how the TPS affected the Salvadorans' daily 
life. Following the same idea, Goldring et	al. (2009, p. 243) called for the 
use of the term «precarious legal status» in order to «draw attention to 
the systemic, legal and normalized production of a range of precarious, or 
less than full, im/migration statuses» that they observe in the Canadian 
context. In turn, Kofman (2002, p. 1’051) used the term «civic stratifica-
tion» to describe the complex system developed by European states that 
«differentiate access to civil, economic and social rights depending on 
mode of entry and legal status». 
In line with these authors, this paper aims to demonstrate that even 
within the «legal immigrant group», there is a wide scale of statuses that 
determine an immigrant’s position in the host society – and therefore the 
chances he or she has to integrate into this society. Goldring et	al. (2009) 




of statuses (sponsored family members, refugee claimants, temporary 
workers, visitors, students, and persons with no status), emphasizing that 
no hierarchy of status should be deduced from the fact that they use the 
term «gradation» to describe this range of situation. Conversely, this ar-
ticle focuses solely on the refugee group and explores the subdivision of 
their administrative statuses. By doing so, I intend to highlight the actual 
administrative hierarchy that is produced by Switzerland’s legislation, 
and the impact that this hierarchy has on refugees’ labour market inte-
gration in the long run.  
Concrete implications for public policies are at stake. Any revision of the 
laws regarding refugees’ statuses and residence permits can have imme-
diate consequences on the individuals’ lives and their chances to inte-
grate into the society. In Switzerland, if efforts are made on encouraging 
refugees’ labour market participation, the latest legislative changes have 
shown that when it comes to the residence permits, Switzerland is rather 
taking the opposite direction (Bertrand, 2017). An example of the ongo-
ing public policies lies in the will of the Swiss authorities to shorten the 
asylum procedure. Although such a measure can be seen as an improve-
ment, the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) is in fact giving the prior-
ity to cases leading to a negative decision (mainly Dublin cases and dis-
missed applicants), while the requests of people who have a high proba-
bility to obtain some form of protection (refugee status or provisional ad-
mission) come after2. For the latter, this leads to long years of waiting 
with an asylum seeker status. On that matter, according to the Federal 
Council, «obstacles to the [asylum seekers’] labour market integration 
must be maintained until the asylum decision» (Conseil fédéral, 2016, 
p. 35, our translation). 
Seeking asylum in Switzeland: The residence permit system 
Switzerland’s legislation regarding residence permits is divided into the 
Asylum Act (AsylA) and the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals (FNA). The 
AsylA aims at regulating the asylum procedure and legal statuses of refu-
gees in Switzerland, while the FNA addresses the questions of foreigners’ 
stays and integration. Table 1 summarizes the various possible statuses 
(and, for Switzerland, the residence permits). A comparison is made with 
                                                 
2. See, for example, the SEM statement of 24.09.2015 (www.sem.admin.ch/sem/ 
fr/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-09-24.html) and the Federal Council and Federal Of-
fice for Migration report (Conseil fédéral, ODM, 2014, p. 9). 
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the statuses given by the European legislation (Bader, 2018, p. 72). I pro-
vide a detailed explanation of the Swiss asylum procedure and permit 
changes in Bertrand (2017, pp. 13-19) but, in summary, four main resi-
dence permits can be granted to persons who have come to Switzerland 
to seek asylum: 
– The N permit is the asylum seekers’ permit. It concerns people whose 
asylum request is being examined by the authorities (Art. 42 AsylA). 
At the end of the asylum procedure, asylum seekers are either forced 
to leave Swiss territory (if the asylum request is rejected), or allowed 
to stay in the country (if the request is accepted or, in case of rejection, 
if there are legal reasons to let them stay) – and therefore are granted 
another status and residence permit. 
– The F permit is a provisional admission. It allows temporary stay on 
the territory for rejected asylum seekers that Switzerland cannot de-
port (either because sending them back would put their lives at risk 
or merely because of practical reasons, Art. 83 FNA). Each year, the 
renewal of their authorization to stay is submitted to evaluation (in-
dividuals facing therefore the same situation of “permanent tempo-
rariness” depicted by Bailey et	al.	(2002)). Part of the F permit holders 
are recognized refugees to whom asylum was denied. Such status ap-
plies to those «who qualify for the refugee status according to the Ge-
neva Convention but not in the sense of the Swiss AsylA» (Bader, 2018, 
p. 72), for instance, when their reasons to seek for asylum arose after 
or because they fled their country (Art. 53 and 54 AsylA).  
– The B permit is a residence permit that can be given for several rea-
sons: 1) to recognized refugees who were granted asylum (Art. 60 
AsylA); 2) because of humanitarian reasons, for N and F permit hold-
ers who can prove that they are «highly integrated» in the Swiss soci-
ety (Art. 14 al.2 AsylA and Art.84 al.5 FNA); 3) for other reasons such 
as marriage with a Swiss citizen or with a B/C permit holder. 
– The C permit is a settlement permit that is usually given to «well inte-
grated» individuals after 5 to 10 years of residence with a B permit 
(Art. 34 FNA). 
It should be pointed out that B and C permits are also the main residence 
permits that are given to «non-refugee foreigners» who have come to 
Switzerland for work or family reasons. This explains why B and C permit 
holders with a refugee background tend to become «statistically invisi-
ble» as soon as they receive such residence permits, as they often fade 
into the vast majority of B and C permit holders who are not concerned 





























































tlement permit  C  No restriction  No restriction  No restriction 
Based on Bader (2018, p. 72) for the statuses’ comparison between Swiss and EU legislation. 
In addition to the aforementioned information, Table 1 gives an indica-
tion of the restrictions that are imposed on each category regarding ac-
cess to labour market, mobility, and right to family reunification (based 
on the AsylA and the FNA). To mention only a few examples, asylum seek-
ers (N permit) face a waiting period of 3 to 6 months before being allowed 
to work. Then, several requirements need to be met, including approval 
of the authorities to whom the employer must first prove that «no suita-
ble domestic employees or citizens of states with which an agreement on 
the free movement of workers has been concluded can be found for the 
job» (Art. 21 FNA). What is more, in order to offset administrative costs 
generated by the asylum procedure, a «special charge» is taken directly 
from the asylum seeker’s wage (10% of earned income, up to 15’000 
Swiss francs – Art. 86 AsylA). All of this results in troublesome adminis-
trative procedures that can discourage the employers. However, asylum 
seekers are not the only ones facing obstacles to their integration. The 
authorities’ agreement is also required for provisionally admitted per-
sons (F permit), although Article 21 FNA does not apply to them, and they 
also have to pay the «special charge». Although most of the F permit hold-
ers eventually settle in Switzerland (Efionayi-Mäder, Ruedin, 2014), the 
term «provisionally» tends to scare potential employers who are afraid 
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to invest in someone who can be deported back at any time (UNHCR, 
2014)3. Thus, both N and F permit holders fit the definition of «precarious 
legal status» proposed by Goldring et	al. (2009). 
This paper’s aim is to understand the impact of the residence permits on 
refugees’ integration into the labour market. My hypothesis is that the 
more stable the residence permit, the better the chances of labour market 
integration. Schematically, I expect to observe the following hierarchy 
amongst the residence permits: N < F < B < C, going from the most pre-
carious one to the most stable one. The underlying mechanism could be 
both a direct consequence of inequalities between the various residence 
permits in the access to the labour market, as well as an indirect conse-
quence of the obstacles that N and F permit holders can experience in 
other domains. 
I assume that the residence permit influences the labour market integra-
tion – and not the other way round, as can be found, for example, in Vick-
strom (2014), who analysed the role of labour market participation on 
the risk to fall into «irregularity» – because for the refugees, residence 
permit changes depend on the asylum procedure and length of stay, and 
not on labour market participation. One exception is with people granted 
a B permit for humanitarian	reasons, since such status means that the in-
dividual is already «well integrated» in Swiss society in general and the 
labour market in particular (Art. 84 FNA). Other criteria are also consid-
ered, such as the family situation and the possibility of a return to the 
home country, but the economic situation plays a central role in the deci-
sion. Hence, for this group, we face a case of reverse causality (labour 




Two types of trajectories stand at the heart of this paper: trajectories of 
residence permits, and trajectories of labour market integration. So far, 
the question of the link between the socio-economic integration of refu-
                                                 
3. Recognizing that the «special charge» was an obstacle to the labour market in-




gees and their residence status and/or the time spent in the asylum pro-
cedure has been addressed in several cross‐sectional analyses. The study 
of Spadarotto et	al. (2014) is a first example, as it focussed on the labour 
market participation of about 2’700 recognized refugees, provisionally 
admitted persons and persons granted residence permit for humanitar-
ian reasons who arrived in Switzerland between 1997 and 20004. Like-
wise, Bakker et	al. (2014) found significant discrepancies in the economic 
situation of refugees depending on their status (the comparison being 
made between temporary status, permanent status, and Dutch citizen-
ship for the four largest groups of refugees in the Netherlands). For his 
part, in the Belgian context, Wets (2014) concluded that legal status (rec-
ognized refugees, people with subsidiary protection, and asylum seekers) 
only played a minor role in explaining the chances of being employed.  
Complementing the cross-sectional analysis by Wets (2014), Herman and 
Rea (2014) conducted a longitudinal analysis of the recognized refugees 
«career paths» in Belgium, proposing a typology of socio-economic inte-
gration trajectories. However, as the individuals’ career trajectories were 
only followed from the moment they received the refugee status (and not 
from the lodging of the asylum application), this study could not capture 
the effect of the permit changes or the time spent in asylum procedure on 
the types of trajectories. This last point has been answered by Hain-
mueller et	al. (2016), who showed the negative impact on employment 
chances of the length of time spent with an asylum seeker status. Their 
study examined a selected population within the refugee group: individ-
uals who applied for asylum in Switzerland (between 1994 and 2004) 
and who were granted subsidiary protection – not the refugee status – 
within 5 years. This selection explains why the authors did not address 
the question of residence permits. Finally, Torstensson et	 al. (1997) 
showed the possibilities offered by asylum registers to analyse the ad-
ministrative trajectories of Turkish and Somali refugees in Sweden and in 
Switzerland. Their study did not, however, include the issue of the labour 
market trajectories. Conversely, Kogan (2004) did not focus on adminis-
trative trajectories (nor did she concentrate exclusively on the refugee 
group), but she analysed the discrepancies between career sequences of 
immigrants vs. natives in Germany and in the UK. 
                                                 
4. The fact that this study was conducted on behalf of the State Secretariat for Mi-
gration shows that the Swiss authorities have a strong interest in understanding underly-
ing mechanisms of refugees’ labour market integration. 
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Conducting quantitative longitudinal research on such population groups 
represents a real methodological challenge that explains the relative scar-
city of such studies. Researchers often face a lack of data enabling a long-
run follow-up of the refugee population (Liu et	al., 2016, pp. 746-747). In 
addition, comparing the situation between different countries with dif-
ferent legal systems that keep evolving over time can be extremely diffi-
cult, as noted by Beauchemin (2015, p. 24) and Liu et	al.	(2016, p. 764) in 
their analyses of the Migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE) and 
Mexican Migration Project (MMP) databases. Yet, whenever possible, 
adopting a longitudinal perspective is essential when it comes to analys-
ing individuals’ pathways to integration. 
Accordingly, the following analyses are organized in two steps. First, re-
lying on sequence analysis graphical tools (Gabadinho et	al., 2011), I de-
scribe the refugees’ trajectories of residence permits on the one hand, and 
their labour market integration on the other hand. Second, I study the 
causal relation between residence permits and chances to integrate into 
the labour market using discrete time survival models. 
Data 
Data used in this study – hereafter: the «Refugee database» – consist of 
matched population registers and allow a longitudinal follow-up of the 
individuals (Steiner, Wanner, 2015; Wanner et	al., 2016). Precisely, the 
record linkage between the Automatic Registration System of Persons 
(for N and F permit holders), the Central Register of Foreign Nationals 
(for B and C permit holders, as well as other permits concerning, for ex-
ample, family members of diplomats), and the Population and House-
holds Statistics (covering, since 2010, both the permanent and the non-
permanent resident population of Switzerland) allows following the ref-
ugee population over time. These registers include administrative infor-
mation such as citizenship, residence permit, date of birth, sex, marital 
status, and duration of stay. Yet, the Refugee database does not include 
information about the households. 
These registers are supplemented by data from the Central Compensa-
tion Office (CCO), the Confederation’s agency in charge of the 1st pillar 
social insurances. The CCO data provides information on each individ-
ual’s annual wage (i.e., the income from an employed or self-employed 
activity). Both sources combined constitute therefore a unique oppor-
tunity to investigate the labour market integration process at the individ-
ual level. Such possibilities offered by the use of public statistics are even 




survey would raise significant issues (including the question of how to 
reach the refugee population, not to mention the very low response rate 
expected from individuals who may be very suspicious of any question-
naire that might remind them of the asylum procedure).  
Of course, there are drawbacks to this approach: the administrative pur-
pose of public statistics entails the lack of some information. One can only 
regret the absence of indication of hourly wage (a lack that will have an 
impact on the labour market integration indicator), educational level, 
number of children, health status, housing type and, last but not least, 
about the outcome of the asylum procedure. This last point explains why, 
for example, when a change from N permit to B permit occurs, it is not 
possible to know whether such a transition is a consequence of the recog-
nition of the refugee status or if it is due to a marriage with a Swiss citizen 
or with a holder of a B/C permit (even if this last scenario certainly ap-
plies to fewer individuals). Likewise, a change from F permit to B permit 
can also be the consequence of a marriage, although it is more likely that 
the residence permit was granted for humanitarian reasons (Art. 84 
FNA). Note that a change from an N permit to a B permit for humanitarian 
reasons can theoretically also occur (Art. 14 AsylA), but such cases are 
rare. 
The refugee population includes all the individuals who came to Switzer-
land since 2000 and who were still in the country for at least a year be-
tween 2010 and 2013. This selection criterion is entailed by the impossi-
bility to compile databases for refugees who left Switzerland before 2010. 
It should also be noted that refugees who had access to Swiss citizenship 
before 2010 cannot be identified in the registers.  
Furthermore, as this study focusses on labour market integration trajec-
tories, only the individuals who were aged between 18 and 49 when they 
arrived in Switzerland are selected. This population is therefore com-
posed of 53’562 individuals, of whom 69% are men – a population that 
will be referred as to «the 2000-2013 arrival cohorts», as opposed to a 
subgroup named «the 2000-2004 arrival cohorts», which only includes 
refugees who can be followed for at least ten years after their arrival to 
Switzerland. The «2000-2004 arrival cohorts» contains 10’248 individu-
als (57% men). 
Appendix 1 shows the frequencies for each nationality (or nationality of 
origin for refugees who became Swiss citizens) by sex for the 2000-2013 
arrival cohorts. Main countries of origin are Eritrea, Sri Lanka, Afghani-
stan, Somalia, China and Tibet, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Nigeria, which to-
gether represent more than 60% of the refugees.  
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Given the lack of any indication about their employment status, the only 
information available to measure the refugees’ labour market integration 
is their annual wage (i.e. the income from an employed or self-employed 
activity). Hence the question: «What is the minimum wage one should 
earn to be considered properly integrated in the labour market?» The 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO/OFS) approach for the at-risk-of-
poverty level is to fix the threshold at 50% of the median of equivalized 
disposable income of households (OFS, 2016). Indeed, it is a poverty indi-
cator, measured at the households’ level. This study extends this approach 
to create a labour	market	integration indicator, measured at the individu‐
als’ level, by taking the threshold of 50% of the annual median wage in 
Switzerland. This median wage is calculated amongst all	men	 living	 in	
Switzerland (not only amongst the refugee population) who constitute 
the reference group. I do so in order to reduce the bias induced by the fact 
that the hourly wage is unknown, as in Switzerland full-time work is 
much more common for men than it is for women (Bläuer Herrmann, 
Murier, 2016). Indeed, the threshold varies over time, from 32’402 Swiss 
francs in 2000 to 35’631 Swiss francs in 2013. Although somewhat im-
perfect, this indicator still represents a solution for approaching labour 
market integration through registers data. 
Results 
Trajectories amongst the residence permits 
Graphical representations of individual state sequences are used to de-
scribe the refugees’ trajectories of residence permits. As the information 
pertaining to the refugees’ residence permit is available only at the end 
of each year, the granularity is annual. Several «states» can be listed, four 
of them consisting of the most common cases: the N, F, B, and C permits. 





«CH» for Swiss nationality, «UD» for undocumented workers and «ABR» 




Figure 1 shows the trajectories of the 2000-2004 arrival cohorts from the 
end of the first year of their arrival in Switzerland (t1) until their tenth 
year in the country (t10). Here, sequences are sorted so the refugees are 
grouped together according to the last permit they held. Four colours pre-
vail: light orange for asylum seekers (N permit), dark orange for provi-
sional admission (F permit), light green for B permit holders and dark 
green for C permit holders. Amongst them, orange colours dominate, 
which means that the first 10 years of presence in Switzerland are mostly 
spent with the most precarious residence permits. In fact, nearly a third 
                                                 
5. The «OTH» category includes residence permits for members of the families of 
intergovernmental organizations/foreign representations, permits for foreign nationals 
who are resident in a foreign border zone, and short-term residence permits. The cate-
gory «undocumented worker» refers to persons who contribute to social insurance (a 
contribution deducted from the person’s income) although they are not registered as liv-
ing in Switzerland during the year under observation. Finally, it should be mentioned that 
the «ABR» category can, in a few cases, indicate that the individual is deceased (although 
most of the time it simply means that he/she emigrated). 
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of the 10’248 refugees still held a precarious permit after 10 years 
– mostly an F permit (27.3%), while 3.4% (350 individuals) remained 
with an asylum seeker permit in t10. In time, the proportion of precarious 
permits decreased to be replaced by more stable permits: 43.8% end up 
with a B permit in t10, and 24.7% with a C permit. It should be remem-
bered that here only the refugees who stayed in the country for at least 
10 years are examined6, while those who were deported back to their 
country of origin or to another country in the meantime are not included 
in Figure 1 (see Appendix 2 for a broader view of the sequences for the 
2000-2013 arrival cohorts). 
Although, as mentioned, the information about the outcome of the asylum 
procedure is not available in the data, several hypotheses can be made 
based on Figure 1. In fact, until 2014, the recognized refugees were eligi-
ble to a C permit 5 years after they applied for asylum (Art. 60 AsylA). For 
the others, the 5-year delay starts to run only after they obtain a B permit 
(Art. 34 FNA)7. As a result, I assume that amongst the individuals who 
hold a C permit in t10, many are recognized refugees. Following the same 
idea, I also assume that most of the individuals who hold a B permit in t10 
obtained this B permit for humanitarian	 reasons – an assumption sup-
ported by the fact that many of them experience several years with a pro-
visional admission (F permit). Again, this cannot be verified, recalling that 
a change of residence permit can also be the consequence of a marriage 
with a Swiss citizen or with a holder of a B/C permit. Still, as we will see, 
this link between the status (recognized	refugees vs. persons	granted	B	
permit	for	humanitarian	reasons) and the residence permit in t10 (C per-
mit vs. B permit) is of great importance to understand the mechanisms 
we will observe later8. 
  
                                                 
6. At least 11 years for the 2000 arrival cohort since these individuals had to still 
be present in Switzerland at the end of 2010 or afterwards. 
7. Since February 1, 2014, Art. 34 FNA applies for everyone. The C permit is there-
fore no longer made accessible faster for recognized refugees – which is another example 
of the ongoing policy of restricting access to the most stable permits. 
8. For an in-depth analysis of residence permit trajectories (including transition 







Figure 2 shows the trajectories of men and women of the 2000-2004 ar-
rival cohorts according to the labour market integration indicator. Dark 
blue is used every year the individual is considered integrated in the la-
bour market. Again, sequences are ordered by status from the end of the 
trajectory. What immediately stands out is the gap between men and 
women, as, after 10 years of stay in Switzerland, 53% of men are inte-
grated in the labour market while it is only the case for 19% of women. 
Another prevailing fact is the considerable impact of time in the integra-
tion process, as after every additional year spent in Switzerland more ref-
ugees are incorporated into the labour market according to the indicator. 
Finally, Figure 2 indicates that while some individuals tend to go back-
and-forth between statuses, the main trend is to remain integrated for 
many years once the threshold is reached. It should be pointed out that 
this does not mean refugees remain in the same job from one year to the 
next, but merely that they manage to keep their annual wage above the 
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A first way of addressing the research question is to compare the labour 
market integration rates by residence permit in t10. By doing so, the com-
plexity of the residence permit trajectories is partially ruled out, each in-
dividual being defined only by the permit he/she holds 10 years after ar-
riving in Switzerland. Figures 3 and 4 respectively show the labour mar-















Looking at the situation after 10 years spent in Switzerland, Figure 3 
shows that 9% of men who are still in the asylum procedure (N permit) 
are considered integrated in the labour market. Holders of provisional 
admission (F permit) are in turn 29%, while B and C permit holders are 
respectively 73% and 47% to be considered as integrated. Similar trends 
can be observed amongst women, though with much lower labour market 
integration rates: Barely 4% of women holding an N permit after 10 years 
in Switzerland are considered integrated, while the rate is 5% for the F 
permit holders. Relatively higher rates are found amongst the B permit 
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holders (31% of women integrated in the labour market) and the C per-
mit holders (17%)9. 
These results for B and C permit holders are unexpected, since the hy-
pothesis was that the C permit would lead to better chances of integra-
tion. However, this apparent gap between B and C permit holders hides, 
in fact, the gap between recognized refugees and persons granted B per-
mit for humanitarian reasons mentioned above: there is a strong selec-
tion effect at stake. This interpretation is consistent with the results ob-
tained by Spadarotto et	al. (2014).  
All in all, these descriptive results already show the impact of the resi-
dence permits on labour market integration. The wide gap between the 
integration rates of those who still hold a precarious permit (N/F) after 
10 years spent in Switzerland and those who obtained more stable per-
mits (B/C) in the meantime reflects the cumulative disadvantage process 
that the former suffer in the long run. This result stands when controlling 
for structural variables (nationality, marital status, age, and canton of res-
idence) in logistic regression models (Bertrand, 2017, pp. 227-235). 
We now turn to discrete-time survival models to	grasp	the	dynamics	of 
the	residence	permit	effect	on	the	chances	to	integrate	the	labour	market 
(i.e., income in excess of 50% of the median wage), controlling for possi-
ble confounding variables such as nationality or length of stay. Due to the 
gender discrepancies observed above, models are separated for men and 
women. Survival analysis allows modelling the probability that a given 
event – here «a first integration into the labour market» – occurs over 
time. Discrete-time logistic regression is run on a person-period data file 
to express the chance that the event occurs depending on various explan-
atory factors (either fixed or time-varying), and given the fact that it did 
not occur before. Here, it is not necessary to observe individuals over an 
equal period of time, hence the inclusion in this analysis of the 53’562 
refugees of the 2000-2013 arrival cohorts. Independent variables of the 
model are residence permit, length of stay, age, marital status, nationality, 
and canton of residence. Table 2 shows the results of the residence permit 
variable for men and women, while controlling for the other variables. 
Appendix 3 displays the full model. 
                                                 
9. Amongst the individuals who obtained the Swiss nationality, the rate in t10 is 
68% for men and 57% for women. However, due to the small numbers in both groups (n 
= 28 and n = 14), I prefer to avoid commenting these results. Note that Figures 3 and 4 do 
not show the trajectories of the 38 individuals (30 men and 8 women) who hold another 




















Results of the residence permit variable must be interpreted carefully 
due to its inherent chronology. Not only is it of ordinal nature (as permits 
can be ranked from the most precarious to the most stable), but also ob-
taining a «better» permit is most of the time an irreversible event (for 
example, a refugee who has a C permit in t will not revert to N permit in 
t	+ 1). In the survival analysis framework this has consequences, because 
once the «first integration into the labour market» event has occurred, 
individuals are no longer part of the at-risk population (they are cen-
sored). Indeed, some asylum seekers manage to integrate into the labour 
market despite their precarious status. However, even if these persons 
subsequently get an F, B, or C permit, they will not be included in the odds 
ratio calculation of these categories as they would no longer be at risk of 
experiencing the event. The same reasoning applies at each «level» of the 
residence permit. Thus, to take an example from Table 2, one should not 
interpret the odds ratio of the male C permit holders as a sign that their 
chances to integrate into the labour market are multiplied by 1.9 com-
pared to those of the asylum seekers (N permit). In fact, this should be 
understood as the chances to integrate with a C permit for	the	individuals	
who	did	not	experience	the	event	with	a	more	precarious	permit, compared 
to the chances an asylum seeker at risk during the same period would 
have had. Therefore, each of the odds ratios must be interpreted as the 
residence permit effect on labour market integration chances considering	
that	integration	did	not	«occur»	with	a	more	precarious	permit. 
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Amongst men, the odds ratios of F, B, and C permits gradually increase10. 
This gradation not only follows the hypothesis concerning the hierarchy 
of N, F, B, and C permits for the chances of labour market integration, but 
most of all means that for	the	individuals	who	find	it	the	hardest	to	inte‐
grate	into	the	labour	market,	the	most	vulnerable	persons,	accessing	a	more	
stable	permit	makes	their	endeavour	easier	to	achieve. To use an analogy, 
the residence permit hierarchy can be seen as a «net» with an increas-
ingly tighter mesh: the transition to a more stable permit increases the 
probability of labour market integration for refugees who have so far 
fallen through the cracks. 
Amongst women, other trends are observed. For them, the F permit does 
not seem to improve the chances to integrate into the labour market com-
pared to the N permit. However, holders of a B permit distinguish them-
selves significantly. An hypothesis to explain the apparent lag between 
N/F and B permits amongst women is that the labour market integration 
indicator fails, by construction, to account for undeclared work. Yet, it is 
possible that women holders of an N/F permit find themselves in such a 
situation, for example if they cumulate multiple small jobs in the domestic 
economy sector – especially if the employers try to avoid the administra-
tive burden encountered when hiring N/F permit holders. In turn, it is 
much easier to officially employ someone once the B permit is obtained. 
Therefore, if undeclared work amongst N/F permit holders could have 
been taken into account, a smaller difference would probably have been 
observed amongst women between N, F, and B permit holders. More sur-
prising is the result for the C permit holders, as it appears that they have 
fewer chances than the B permit holders to integrate into the labour mar-
ket. Nevertheless, we should consider the at-risk population: amongst the 
C permit holders, only those who did not experience the event with a 
more precarious permit remain at this point – constituting a selected 
population. Moreover, the fact that individuals who are not in the labour 
force «by choice» (for example to stay at home and take care of children) 
                                                 
10. The results for F, B, and C permits are significant compared to the reference cat-
egory (N permit) but also from one another (as checked by permuting the reference cate-
gory). As mentioned earlier, the OTH/UD/missing category will not be discussed as it co-
vers many situations and concerns only few cases. As for those who obtained Swiss na-
tionality, the small number of cases probably explains why the results are mitigated and 
non-significant both for men and women. The reason is that most naturalized individuals 




cannot be distinguished from individuals who are unemployed but look-
ing for a job perhaps explains why results are more ambiguous for 
women. 
Apart from the impact of the residence permit, the analyses show the im-
portance of other factors on the chances to integrate into the labour mar-
ket (see Appendix 3). The length of stay is indeed a key determinant of 
the integration process11. Being married (which can be a proxy for having 
to take care of children) is a factor of exclusion for women, while, for men, 
marriage increases the chances of integration into the labour market. Fi-
nally, nationality appears as a major determinant of labour market inte-
gration, although further analyses would be needed to explain whether 
inequalities are due to social network, educational level, or if they are the 
result of employers’ discrimination towards certain communities. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, results show that residence permits and labour market par-
ticipation are closely tied, a more stable permit generally increasing the 
chances to integrate into the labour market. In other words, the economic 
status matches the administrative status. The economic vulnerability of 
the refugee population – the so-called «refugee gap» – has been already 
well documented.	By digging deeper into the administrative categoriza-
tion of the individuals, this paper shows that within	the refugee popula-
tion, the host countries’ legislation creates an additional hierarchy, based 
on the residence permits, that further widens the inequalities. To come 
back to the words of Goldring et	al. (2009) and Menjívar (2006), individ-
uals who hold precarious residence permits (or «less than full immigra-
tion statuses») find themselves in this legal «grey area» of in-between sit-
uations where they are granted the right to be present in the host country, 
                                                 
11. Not surprisingly, the chances of being considered integrated in the labour mar-
ket are extremely low at the beginning of the stay in Switzerland, but they increase with 
the length of stay (and therefore with the risk exposure). Then, the apparent «decline» 
that we observe after 8 or 9 years of stay could be the conjunction of two factors: the first 
would be that of a certain «demotivation» of individuals who would still not have man-
aged, after many years, to find a place on the labour market and who would then give up. 
The second would consist of a selection	effect that would result in those «most apt» to find 
a job doing so during the first decade of their stay (which would lead to censoring since 
they would already have experienced the event), while those whose profile is less «attrac-
tive» for employers would remain in the population at risk until the end of the 14 years of 
observation. 
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but with limited integration opportunities. As a consequence, those who 
live many years with the asylum seekers status (N permit) or as provi-
sionally admitted persons (F permit) go through a process of cumulative 
disadvantage. 
The residence permit alone does not explain all the inequalities in the 
participation to the labour market. Nevertheless, as it is a factor of vul-
nerability that is shaped by legislation, practical implications are at stake 
in terms of public policies to improve the integration of the refugee pop-
ulation into the labour market (and thus a broader integration into the 
society). Concrete measures include simplifying the criteria for granting 
the most stable permits as well as improving the rights of the most pre-
carious ones (in particular on the subjects of labour market, family reu-
nification, housing, and mobility). However, while the Swiss authorities 
are currently taking action to foster the integration of recognized refu-
gees and provisionally admitted persons into the labour market, they are 
at the same time restricting access to the most stable residence permits. 
This article demonstrates the paradox of such a policy. 
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  N  %  N  % 
Afghanistan  2’499  6.80  724  4.30 
Algeria  837  2.28  49  0.29 
Angola  276  0.75  365  2.17 
Armenia  108  0.29  95  0.56 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  402  1.09  507  3.01 
Cameroon  126  0.34  142  0.84 
China and Tibet  1’925  5.24  1’181  7.02 
Côte d’Ivoire  254  0.69  85  0.50 
Democratic Republic of Congo  400  1.09  629  3.74 
Eritrea  5’086  13.85  3’734  22.18 
Ethiopia  487  1.33  574  3.41 
Georgia  413  1.12  78  0.46 
Iraq  2’212  6.02  703  4.18 
Iran  1’048  2.85  535  3.18 
Kosovo  544  1.48  482  2.86 
Latin America  83  0.23  67  0.40 
Macedonia  233  0.63  237  1.41 
Mongolia  55  0.15  96  0.57 
Nigeria  1’804  4.91  257  1.53 
Other Africa  4’214  11.47  490  2.91 
Other Asia/Oceania  456  1.24  188  1.12 
Other Europe  261  0.71  167  0.99 
Pakistan  293  0.80  55  0.33 
Russia  321  0.87  299  1.78 
Serbia  815  2.22  864  5.13 
Somalia  2’272  6.19  840  4.99 
Sri Lanka  2’804  7.63  1’033  6.14 
Syria  1’967  5.36  925  5.50 
Togo  335  0.91  137  0.81 
Tunisia  1’614  4.39  68  0.40 
Turkey  1’928  5.25  1’025  6.09 
Yemen  105  0.29  64  0.38 
Unknown/Stateless  553  1.51  137  0.81 
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Appendix 3: Explanatory factors of the occurrence of  
the event «first integration into the labour 
market», discrete time survival models 
– odds ratios, 2000‐2013 arrival cohorts 
  Men  Women 
Residence permit (ref. = N) 
F  1.481***  0.930 
B  1.630***  2.019*** 
C  1.858***  1.403** 
CH  1.579  1.720 
OTH/UD/missing  0.566  2.222 
Length of stay (in years) 
1  0.002***  0.002*** 
2  0.291***  0.175*** 
3  0.826***  0.794* 
4  0.858***  1.038 
5 (reference)  1  1 
6  1.101*  1.390** 
7  1.268***  1.726*** 
8  1.339***  2.154*** 
9  1.294***  1.856*** 
10  0.939  1.652*** 
11  0.913  1.763*** 
12  0.916  1.469** 
13  0.671*  1.497* 
14  0.980  1.357 
Age (in years)  1.107***  1.020 
Age2/100  0.811***  0.945° 
Marital status (ref. = not married) 
Married  1.147***  0.670*** 
Unknown  0.122***  0.122*** 
Nationality (ref. = Eritrea) 
Afghanistan  2.322***  1.021 
Algeria  1.428*  0.857 
Angola  3.078***  2.075*** 
Armenia  1.557°  5.111*** 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1.884***  3.727*** 
Cameroon  2.443***  2.276*** 
China and Tibet  3.701***  10.902*** 
Côte d’Ivoire  1.858***  3.143*** 
Democratic Republic of Congo  2.495***  2.750*** 
Ethiopia  2.233***  3.865*** 
Georgia  0.418*  2.485* 
Iraq  2.138***  1.268 
Iran  1.238**  2.791*** 
Kosovo  1.908***  1.967*** 
Latin America  1.546°  2.644** 
Macedonia  1.995***  2.827*** 
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Mongolia  1.566  2.687* 
Nigeria  0.699°  2.209° 
Other Africa  1.377***  2.724*** 
Other Asia/Oceania  2.122***  3.378*** 
Other Europe  1.893***  3.319*** 
Pakistan  3.105***  1.766 
Russia  1.083  2.190*** 
Serbia  1.713***  2.275*** 
Somalia  1.193***  1.062 
Sri Lanka  5.041***  2.574*** 
Syria  1.122  0.363** 
Togo  3.142***  2.978*** 
Tunisia  0.899  1.159 
Turkey  1.240***  2.018*** 
Yemen  0.757  0.198 
Unknown/Stateless  0.838  0.929 
Canton of residence (ref. = ZH) 
BE  0.532***  0.592*** 
LU  0.999  0.816° 
UR  0.719*  0.422° 
SZ  1.266**  0.997 
OW  0.823  1.428 
NW  0.592**  0.111* 
GL  0.878  1.230 
ZG  0.896  0.973 
FR  0.947  0.882 
SO  0.826**  0.541*** 
BS  0.666***  0.756 
BL  0.888°  1.042 
SH  0.989  0.869 
AR  0.713**  1.226 
AI  0.651°  5.264*** 
SG  1.082  0.893 
GR  2.010***  1.837*** 
AG  0.733***  0.775* 
TG  0.877  0.597* 
TI  0.577***  0.265*** 
VD  0.878**  0.898 
VS  0.832*  0.829 
NE  0.794**  1.163 
GE  0.960  1.028 
JU  0.454***  0.631 
Unknown  1.477***  1.484** 
Constant  0.024***  0.013*** 
Observations (person‐year)  132’742  89’145 
Log Likelihood  ‐27’888.8  ‐8’276.3 
Akaike Inf. Crit.  55’939.7  16’714.6 
Statistical significance: ° p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
Data source: The «Refugee database». 
